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Abstract
Substantial scholarly attention has been devoted to explaining why voters support populist 
parties. Recently, a new concept has been introduced to gauge populism among voters and to 
explain voting for populist parties: populist attitudes. However, some researchers regard populist 
attitudes as simply another measurement of existing and established concepts such as political 
trust and external political efficacy. Using data from the Netherlands (2018), this article addresses 
the relationship between these concepts, both theoretically and empirically. This article examines 
whether political trust, external political efficacy, and populist attitudes tap into different latent 
dimensions. Using a confirmatory factor analysis, we show that populist attitudes are not old wine 
in new bottles and that they tap into different underlying attitudes than political trust and external 
political efficacy. Furthermore, we show that the three measures are not only different constructs 
but also relate differently to populist voting preferences.
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Introduction
Research on populism, especially on the populist radical right, is abundant. For some time 
now, researchers have been interested in why voters support populist parties. With the suc-
cess of not only populist radical right but also populist left parties, the question has become 
more complex. Researchers are interested in why voters support populist parties beyond 
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their left-right ideology (Akkerman et al., 2017; Rooduijn, 2018; Van Hauwaert and Van 
Kessel, 2018). Is there something about populism that attracts voters to parties as diverse 
as Podemos in Spain or the French Rassemblement national? Framing the problem as such 
has sharpened the focus on whether voters for populist parties share unique attributes that 
capture the essential and core features of populism beyond its left and right variants.
Earlier research often conflated radical right, fascist, and extremist parties with pop-
ulism. However, more recently, increased conceptual clarity has allowed researchers to 
clearly identify which parties are populist and which are not (Mudde, 1996, 2007; 
Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2017; Taggart, 1995). According to Mudde (2004), the core of 
populism can be reduced to three essential components. First, populism is people-
centered, and it is anti-elite: populism pits the pure people against the corrupt elite. 
Second, the dichotomy between the pure people and the corrupt elite is antagonistic (or 
what is often referred to as Manichean). Third, and finally, populists proclaim that politics 
should be an expression of the general will of the people.
Three sets of attitudes are commonly associated with voting for populist parties. First, 
researchers use political trust as an indicator to explain why individuals vote for populist 
parties (e.g. Doyle, 2011; Fieschi and Heywood, 2004; Rooduijn, 2018). Employing 
political trust implies that those who have a lower level of trust toward political elites 
(Rooduijn, 2018) or political institutions (Fieschi and Heywood, 2004) are more likely to 
support populist parties. This taps into the anti-elitist component of populism, with anti-
elitist sentiments defined as anti-politician or anti-institution. Second, external political 
efficacy is used to explain support for populist parties (e.g. Rooduijn et al., 2016). External 
political efficacy taps into the feeling that citizens’ opinions are not heard by politicians. 
The expectation is that individuals with lower external political efficacy are more likely 
to vote for populist parties because political elites are not sufficiently attentive to citizens’ 
demands, that is, tapping into the anti-elitist component of populism.
More recently, scholars have developed another approach: the populist attitudes 
approach (Akkerman et al., 2014; Castanho Silva et al., 2019; Hawkins et al., 2012; Van 
Hauwaert et al., 2019; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018). According to the populist 
attitudes approach, populism is an individual attribute that can be directly measured 
among individuals and is therefore not only a feature of political parties (Akkerman et al., 
2014; Hawkins et al., 2012; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018). The populist attitudes 
construct includes the three components of populism: people-centrism and anti-elitism, 
the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite, and a focus on the general 
will. In particular, it focuses on the juxtaposition between a people-centered notion of 
political representation and the corrupt political elite. The expectation offered by this 
approach is that individuals with stronger populist attitudes are more likely to vote for 
populist parties.
To capture the core elements of populism, studies have scrutinized the effects of politi-
cal trust, external political efficacy, and populist attitudes on populist voting behavior, 
either separately or simultaneously (e.g. Akkerman et al., 2017; Spruyt et al., 2016; Van 
Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018). However, sometimes, these items (in combination with 
others) are used to assess other concepts. For example, Passarelli and Tuorto (2018) com-
bine political efficacy items, political trust items, and items on a “belief in a functioning 
party democracy” to assess system discontent. Furthermore, some have questioned the 
uniqueness of the three concepts and suggested that populist attitudes may not be substan-
tially different from external political efficacy (Van der Kolk, 2018) or are simply “old 
wine in new bottles” (Rooduijn, 2019: 364).
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This conceptual and empirical ambiguity leads us to the central purpose of this article. 
We investigate the extent to which political trust, external political efficacy, and populist 
attitudes are different constructs, both on a theoretical and an empirical level. We are 
interested in the extent to which political trust, external political efficacy, and populist 
attitudes are different concepts, the degree to which they are empirically different, and the 
extent to which these three indicators are unique predictors of voting for populist parties. 
To answer our research question, we start by discussing the conceptual difference between 
political trust, external political efficacy, and populist attitudes and their theoretical rela-
tionship with populism. Subsequently, we perform exploratory and confirmatory factor 
analyses. In doing so, we examine the extent to which political trust, external political 
efficacy, and populist attitudes tap into different latent constructs. We then use these three 
indicators to examine the unique explanatory power of each measurement for voting for 
a populist party.
To conduct this analysis, we use data from the Dutch Nationaal Referendumonderzoek 
2018 (Jacobs et al., 2018b) and the Political and Values survey (CentERdata, 2018). 
These surveys contain information about political attitudes and behavior among Dutch 
respondents. Our findings show that political trust, external political efficacy, and popu-
list attitudes indeed address different underlying dimensions, and they furthermore relate 
differently to voting for a populist party: the likelihood of voting for populist parties is 
higher when political trust is low and populist attitudes are high, while it is not related to 
external political efficacy. However, if we further differentiate between populist parties 
(i.e. between the populist radical right and the populist radical left), we find that populist 
attitudes are the only measure that consistently explains voting preferences for these ideo-
logically diverse populist parties.
Populism, Political Trust, External Political Efficacy, and 
Populist Attitudes
In this article, we employ an ideational approach to populism (Mudde, 2004, 2017). 
Applying the ideational approach has been the most successful in terms of identifying and 
explaining populism in Europe and beyond (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013, 2017). 
Moreover, given that the ideational approach argues that populism is a set of ideas, it fol-
lows that populism can be measured in various sources: party platforms, leaders’ speeches, 
and among individuals (Akkerman et al., 2014; Hawkins, 2009; Rooduijn and Pauwels, 
2011).
Applying the ideational approach to populism, we come to several important conclu-
sions. First, populism has a core set of ideas (ideology), that is, it is possible to precisely 
indicate what populism is and what it is not. Second, even though the core ideological 
components of populism can be clearly defined, the populist ideology itself is thin-
centered. This implies that populism cannot stand on its own and that it must be attached 
to other ideologies. For this reason, we encounter left- and right-wing populism (Mudde, 
2004; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017; Stanley, 2008). Furthermore, since we do not 
define populism as a style (e.g. Moffitt, 2016) or a strategy (Weyland, 2001), but as a 
thin-centered ideology, it can be used to measure the attitudes (ideas) of voters.
According to Mudde (2004), what populist parties, both left- and right-wing, have in 
common can be summed up by three essential components. As previously stated, (1) 
populism is people-centered and anti-elite, pitting the pure people against the corrupt 
elite; (2) it entails a clash between the pure people and the corrupt elite (it is antagonistic); 
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and (3) populists proclaim that politics should be an expression of the general will of the 
people (Mudde, 2004):
an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and 
antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics 
should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people. (Mudde, 2004: 543)
Defining populism as such is important on two levels. First, it distinguishes populism 
from not only elitism but also pluralism. The antagonistic nature of populism, with its 
emphasis on the two opposing groups, that is, the pure people and the corrupt elite 
(Manichean nature), implies that populism is wary of pluralism and political compromise 
(Akkerman et al., 2014; Mudde, 2004). Second, the people-centered nature of populism 
distinguishes populism from simply anti-establishment and protest voting. As such, pop-
ulism is posited as an alternative to the existing notions of political representation (i.e. a 
people-centered notion of political representation rather than a so-called elite-based one). 
Therefore, populism cannot simply be reduced to anti-elitism.
As noted, three sets of attitudes are generally used to explain an individual’s vote 
choice for populist parties: political trust, external political efficacy, and populist atti-
tudes. In the following section, we elaborate on these three concepts and link them to the 
concept of populism as presented above. For each concept, we define the concept and 
then discuss its theoretical relationship to populism and the empirical evidence for its 
relationship with populist voting.
Political Trust
Trust is the evaluation that a person gives of another entity (e.g. a political institution) 
(Van der Meer and Hakhverdian, 2017). Thus, for example, a citizen evaluates a political 
party, government, or parliament (Thomassen et al., 2017). Political trust measures the 
extent to which individuals feel that political parties, government, or parliament fulfill 
their expectations, that is, their policy expectations (Craig et al., 1990). There is a discus-
sion, and some confusion, over whether political trust refers to policy outcomes (i.e. sat-
isfaction) or whether it refers to trust in political institutions or in a political regime (Craig 
et al., 1990; Hetherington, 1998; Norris, 2011). Increasingly, the literature makes a dis-
tinction between regime satisfaction, policy outcomes, and the functioning of political 
institutions; the latter is more related to the dominant use of political trust (Thomassen 
et al., 2017). Craig et al. (1990: 291) note that political trust relates to “outputs” in relation 
to “individual expectations.” In other words, political trust is the belief that the political 
institutions will act in the public interest (Craig, 1979). It does not necessarily measure 
the extent to which institutions are responsive to public demands (Craig, 1979; Craig 
et al., 1990). It is conceivable that an individual may possess high levels of trust in an 
institution that has very little public access (or even low levels of political accountability), 
such as an independent central bank.
Political trust taps into a core component of populism, namely, the opposition to the 
“corrupt elite.” Specifically, a lack of trust taps into feelings that political elites (who run 
political institutions) no longer produce policies that serve the interests of the people 
(Craig et al., 1990; Fieschi and Heywood, 2004). In other words, political trust addresses 
the anti-elitism of populism. Those who use political trust tend to perceive populism as a 
protest against the political elites. For example, Rooduijn (2018: 356) states: “I label 
those who vote populist out of political distrust ‘protest voters.’”
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However, using political trust as an indicator of voting for a populist party does not 
address other core components of populism. It does not address the people-centeredness 
of populism, its antagonistic nature, or the general will. For example, political trust does 
not define the people as pure and homogeneous. Just because an individual has lower 
levels of trust, does not mean that he or she does not (or cannot) possess a pluralistic 
notion of the people. Moreover, if an individual has less political trust, this does not nec-
essarily entail an antagonistic relationship between the people and the political elite, 
something that is integral to populism. In addition, the concept does not capture the notion 
of the general will.
Using political trust to explain voting for a populist party is common among research 
in the field of populism (Betz, 1994; Fieschi and Heywood, 2004; Rooduijn, 2018). The 
findings, however, are inconsistent. Akkerman et al. (2017) find that populist radical 
right- and populist radical left-wing voters have lower levels of political trust, and this is 
particularly the case for the populist radical right. Norris (2005) also argues that lower 
levels of political trust correlate with voting for the populist radical right. However, 
Norris (2005) also notes that there are instances when this is not the case (i.e. Israel and 
Italy) and concludes that we should be cautious when linking levels of trust to different 
levels of success of radical right parties. In addition, Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel (2018) 
find that those who vote for left-wing populist parties have lower levels of political trust, 
but those who vote for right-wing populist parties do not. Furthermore, Rooduijn (2018) 
has shown that political distrust is unable to explain populist voting consistently across 
countries and over time.
External Political Efficacy
Political efficacy is often broken down into two different dimensions: internal and exter-
nal political efficacy (Craig et al., 1990). The former refers to the extent to which an 
individual “feels competent to avail himself of the opportunity to use” institutional chan-
nels (Craig, 1979: 229). External political efficacy moves from internal, personal beliefs 
to institutional “responsiveness” (Craig, 1979: 229). External political efficacy refers to 
the extent to which an individual feels that he or she has influence on the political process 
and the degree to which he or she believes that political institutions are responsive to their 
demands (Craig, 1979; Craig et al., 1990).
It is important to emphasize that external political efficacy does not (necessarily) refer 
to an individual’s capacity (i.e. internal political efficacy). Rather, it refers to perceptions 
of institutional receptiveness to individual demands. In addition, external political effi-
cacy is conceptually different from political trust, even though the two are often conflated 
(Craig, 1979; Craig et al., 1990). For example, it is possible to imagine a situation in 
which a person has low external political efficacy, that is, a person feels that he or she has 
little influence on the political process, but he or she still has a high degree of political 
trust. In other words, he or she may believe that political institutions produce policies for 
the general good of citizens.
External political efficacy is used to explain support for populist parties. Turning to the 
three key components of populism, external political efficacy taps into the claim that the 
political elite is not responsive to citizen demands given that politicians do not listen to 
the concerns of the people. It thus addresses the anti-elitism of populism. Although exter-
nal political efficacy has a stronger notion of the people than political trust, the people are 
not necessarily defined as homogeneous or pure. External political efficacy, thus, taps 
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into more general feelings of political discontent (Passarelli and Tuorto, 2018; Rooduijn 
et al., 2016; Van der Brug, 2003), related to the lack of responsiveness of the political 
institutions. Thereby, it does not relate specifically to the idea that the people are ulti-
mately sovereign, as is highlighted in the definition of populism. Moreover, the elite is 
not presented as inherently in opposition to the people. Rather, it is the current elites that 
are perceived as unresponsive. Hence, external political efficacy does not capture the 
antagonistic relationship between the pure people and the corrupt elite, which is a core 
component of populism. Furthermore, external political efficacy does not capture the idea 
of the general will. In sum, the antagonism between the pure people and the corrupt elite 
and the notion of the general will are absent in the concept of external political efficacy.
Research seems to support the idea that people with lower levels of external political 
efficacy are more likely to vote for populist parties; however, empirical findings are 
inconsistent. For example, Rooduijn et al. (2016) demonstrate that individuals who feel 
that they have less influence over the political process (in combination with supply side 
factors) are more likely to support a left- or right-wing populist party. Van Hauwaert and 
Van Kessel (2018) find that while voters for left-wing populist parties demonstrate lower 
levels of external political efficacy, voters for right-wing populist parties do not.
In conclusion, several studies have used political trust and external political efficacy to 
explain voting for a populist party. The use of political trust implies that populism is about 
the mistrust of political institutions and the political elites that run the institutions, while the 
use of external political efficacy is about the process and frustration or impotence regarding 
the ability of individuals to have their opinions heard by political elites. Nevertheless, both 
measures seem to focus mainly on the anti-elitist component of populism. They both lack a 
strong notion of the people, there is no explicit focus on the clash between the pure people 
and the corrupt elite, and the concepts do not address the general will.
Populist Attitudes
In contrast to political trust and external political efficacy, populist attitudes attempt to 
directly measure populism among individuals. As noted, populism has three core compo-
nents. Thus, to adequately measure populism, the concept has to include (1) the anti-
elitist and people-centered notion of politics. The purity and the sovereignty of the people 
must play a central role in the populist attitudes measurement and there must be a juxta-
position of the people against the elite (Rooduijn, 2014; Zaslove, 2008). In addition, (2) 
the measurement needs to tap into the idea that politics is antagonistic, pitting the pure 
people against the corrupt elite (Mudde, 2004). Finally, (3) the measurement should cap-
ture the idea the politics should be an expression of the general will.
Theoretically, populist attitudes differ considerably from political trust and external 
political efficacy. Populist attitudes are related to the antagonistic but mutually reinforc-
ing distinction between the pure people and the corrupt elite. If politics is inherently cor-
rupting (Taggart, 2018), then it is only through “nonpoliticians” that the true will of the 
people can be represented. Low levels of political trust and feelings regarding nonrespon-
sive political institutions (external political efficacy) are manifestations of general politi-
cal discontent. Populism goes a step further. The populist ideology posits a people-centered 
notion of political representation to solve feelings of political discontent. Individuals with 
strong populist attitudes, thus, do not simply oppose the political elites because they have 
low levels of political trust or low levels of external political efficacy. Rather, populism is 
an ideology that believes that political representation must be people-centered, that is, 
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politics must represent the pure and homogeneous people, an expression of the general 
will, in opposition to both elite and pluralist conceptions of political representation 
(Mudde, 2004; Rummens, 2017). As Spruyt et al. (2016: 336) argue:
what distinguishes the support for populism from simple political discontent and frustrations is 
that populism remains a politics of hope, that is, the hope that where established parties and 
elites have failed, ordinary folks, common sense, and the politicians who give them a voice can 
find solutions.
The above discussion emphasizes that a theoretical distinction needs to be made 
between populist attitudes and other measures, such as political trust and external politi-
cal efficacy. The question is, however, whether this theoretical distinction manifests itself 
empirically. Research on populist attitudes has come to some important findings. 
Akkerman et al. (2014), for example, distinguish populist attitudes from pluralist and elit-
ist attitudes. Other have found that populist attitudes are a good predictor of voting for a 
populist party (e.g. Anduiza et al., 2018; Hawkins et al., 2018) and unifies voting for left- 
and right-wing populist parties (Akkerman et al., 2017; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 
2018). In addition, research shows that individuals with stronger populist attitudes call for 
more direct forms of political representation, such as referenda (Jacobs et al., 2018a). The 
question is, however, whether there is also a clear empirical distinction between populist 
attitudes, political trust, and external political efficacy. We summarize the relation 
between the three sets of attitudes and the core components of populism in Box 1.
Methods and Data
Information on populist attitudes, voting behavior, and background characteristics was 
retrieved from the Nationaal Referendumonderzoek 2018 (NRO2018; Jacobs et al., 
2018b). This dataset contains information on 2,234 respondents who participate in the 
Dutch LISS (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences) panel, administered 
by CentERdata (Tilburg University, the Netherlands). Fieldwork for this survey was 
carried out in March and April 2018 using computer-assisted web interviewing 
(CentERdata, n.d.). Invitations to participate in the survey were sent to 2,838 panel mem-
bers; of these, 2,234 completed the questionnaire, yielding a response rate of 78.7%.
NRO2018 does not contain information on political trust, external political efficacy, 
and attitudes toward income equality, cultural exclusion, and European Union (EU) inte-
gration, but it includes an identifier to link it to a dataset that has such information, 
namely, the 10th wave of Politics and Values (CentERdata, 2018). The Politics and Values 
survey is a key module of the LISS panel and is presented annually to all the panel mem-
bers. A total of 5,734 respondents completed the survey, with a 77.0% response rate. Of 
Box 1. Relating Political Trust, External Political Efficacy, and Populist Attitudes with Populism.
Measure Relation with populism Missing components
Political trust Anti-elite People-centrism; antagonism; 
general will
External political 
efficacy
Anti-elite; “light” notion of 
people
Stronger notion of the people; 
antagonism; general will
Populist attitudes People-centrism; anti-elite; 
antagonism; general will
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the 2,234 NRO2018 respondents, 2,189 also participated in the 10th wave of the Politics 
and Values survey. Of these 2,189 individuals, 1,744 individuals answered all the items 
used for the measurements of political trust, external political efficacy, and populist atti-
tudes. We continue our analysis using these 1,744 individuals.
Case
Our research focuses on the Netherlands, a country that is well suited for our analysis for 
several reasons. First, the Netherlands has not suffered any unusual political or economic 
crises. To be sure, the economic crisis of 2008 and the so-called asylum crisis had an influ-
ence on Dutch politics, but the Netherlands was not hit unusually hard by these events 
(such as Italy, for example). Thus, we do not expect any unusual events or external shocks 
to have an effect on our study. Second, the Netherlands is one of the few countries to have 
both a left- and a right-wing populist party for some time now (Akkerman et al., 2014). 
Thus, in the second part of the article we are able test the relationship between populist 
attitudes and voting for different types of populist parties, across the political spectrum. 
Third, the Netherlands has a multiparty system. Voters who are frustrated with the main-
stream parties are provided with ample exit options “which permits us to better disentangle 
populism from simple vote-switching and protest voting” (Akkerman et al., 2014: 1337).
Variables of Interest
Political Trust. For the political trust measurement, respondents were asked how much 
trust they had in political institutions. The following question was asked: For these insti-
tutions, could you indicate how much trust you have in them? For the responses, 0 indi-
cated “no trust at all,” and 10 indicated “complete trust. This question was asked for ‘the 
government” (Trust1), “the lower house” (Trust2), “politicians” (Trust3), and “political 
parties” (Trust4).
External Political Efficacy. External political efficacy refers to the confidence that people 
have in the responsiveness of political actors. A high external political efficacy thereby 
indicates that individuals have the feeling that political officials listen to the public and 
care about what the public thinks. To measure the external political efficacy of respond-
ents, we rely on a validated three-item measurement developed by Craig et al. (1990). For 
each of these items, respondents had to choose between 0 “that is true” and 1 “that is not 
true.” The three items are presented in Box 2.
Populist Attitudes. For populist attitudes, we rely on the measurement of populist attitudes 
as constructed by (Akkerman et al., 2014). This measurement includes the three defining 
components of populism, as defined by Mudde (2004). For each of the six items (see Box 3), 
respondents had to indicate to what extent they agreed with the statement; 1 indicates 
“totally disagree” and 5 “totally agree.” To prevent ordering effects, we randomly varied 
Box 2. Items Used to Measure External Political Efficacy.
Eff1: Politicians are not interested in what people like me think.
Eff2: Political parties are only interested in my vote, not in my opinion.
Eff3: People like me don’t have any say about what the government does.
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the order in which respondents had to answer the questions. The first block of three items 
(Pop1, Pop2, and Pop3) was asked before the second block (Pop4, Pop5, and Pop6) for 
one set of respondents, and after the second block for another set of respondents. Moreo-
ver, within the blocks, the order of the three items was randomized. In between these 
blocks of items, several items on other attitudes were presented.
Populist Voting. In the second part of our analysis, we use populist attitudes, political trust, 
and external political efficacy to explain populist voting. First, we seek to explain the 
populist vote. For this variable, we asked respondents “if there were elections held today, 
which party would you vote for.”1 If they would vote for either the PVV (Partij voor de 
Vrijheid), the SP (Socialistische Partij), or the FvD (Forum voor Democratie), we coded 
them as voting for a populist party (“1”). If they would vote for another party, would cast 
an invalid or blank vote, or if they indicated that they would abstain from voting, they 
were coded as not voting for a populist party (“0”). Those who indicated that they either 
did not want to say what party they would vote for or did not know were excluded from 
further analyses. These analyses show to what extent political trust, external political 
efficacy, and populist attitudes are related to the intention to vote for a populist party in 
general. Second, we apply a multinomial analysis to understand the relationship between 
political trust, external political efficacy, and populist attitudes and voting for specific 
populist parties (i.e. PVV, SP, or FvD). Voting for nonpopulist parties or casting an inva-
lid or blank vote serves as a reference category. We included nonvoters as a separate 
category to further test whether populist attitudes, political trust, and external political 
efficacy tap into different underlying political attitudes. These analyses show whether 
political trust, external political efficacy, and populist attitudes are able to explain voting 
for diverse populist parties, but do not explain nonvoting.
Control Variables. For all our models explaining populist voting, we include education, 
gender, and age as control variables. Furthermore, we add a series of variables that tap 
into the economic (income equality), cultural (cultural exclusion), and political (anti-EU) 
attitudes, which are related to voting for the populist right and the populist left (see Akker-
man et al., 2017; Rooduijn, 2018; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018).2 The descriptive 
information of all the variables used in this article is presented in Table 1.
Method
To address our research question, we apply exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, 
using R (version 3.4.1) with the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012). Since three of our items 
are binary (the external political efficacy items), we used a WLSMV (weighted least 
Box 3. Items Used to Measure Populist Attitudes.
Pop1: The politicians in the Dutch Parliament need to follow the will of the people.
Pop2: The people, and not the politicians, should make the most important political decisions.
Pop3: I would rather be represented by an ordinary citizen than by a professional politician.
Pop4: The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences 
among the people.
Pop5: Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.
Pop6: What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles.
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squares means and variance adjusted) estimation, which uses diagonally weighted least 
squares to estimate model parameters.3 We apply logistic regression analyses to examine 
to what extent political trust, external political efficacy, and populist attitudes can explain 
populist voting behavior. We first estimate the effects of each concept separately and then 
simultaneously. In addition to the logistic analyses for populist vote, we test whether 
political trust, external political efficacy, and populist attitudes predict voting for the three 
populist parties in the Netherlands using multinomial regression analysis.
Analyses
Political Trust, External Political Efficacy, and Populist Attitudes
To examine whether political trust, external political efficacy, and populist attitudes are 
three distinct concepts, we first estimate an exploratory factor analysis. In so doing, we 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
Variable name Minimum Maximum Mean/% Standard 
deviation
N
Political trust −5.01 4.10 0.00 1.86 1744
 Trust1 0.00 9.00 5.58 2.11 1744
 Trust2 0.00 9.00 5.67 2.05 1744
 Trust3 0.00 10.00 4.87 2.10 1744
 Trust4 0.00 10.00 4.80 2.08 1744
External political efficacy −1.83 1.69 0.01 0.72 1744
 Eff1 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.49 1744
 Eff2 0.00 1.00 0.28 0.45 1744
 Eff3 0.00 1.00 0.36 0.48 1744
Populist attitudes −1.13 0.98 0.00 0.41 1744
 Pop1 1.00 5.00 3.54 0.92 1744
 Pop2 1.00 5.00 2.81 1.07 1744
 Pop3 1.00 5.00 2.83 1.01 1744
 Pop4 1.00 5.00 3.59 0.89 1744
 Pop5 1.00 5.00 3.66 0.94 1744
 Pop6 1.00 5.00 3.15 1.10 1744
Populist vote 0.00 1.00 20.4% 1421
Multinomial vote
 PVV 0.00 1.00 6.2% 1421
 SP 0.00 1.00 8.9% 1421
 FvD 0.00 1.00 5.3% 1421
 No Vote 0.00 1.00 2.4% 1421
Middle education 0.00 1.00 35.5% 1743
Higher education 0.00 1.00 39.3% 1743
Female 0.00 1.00 49.4% 1744
Age 18.00 100.00 55.07 16.79 1744
Income equality 1.00 5.00 3.88 0.96 1691
Cultural exclusion 1.00 5.00 3.63 0.92 1703
Anti-EU 1.00 5.00 3.54 1.14 1674
PVV: Partij voor de Vrijheid; SP: Socialistische Partij; FvD: Forum voor Democratie; EU = European Union.
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include the items for the three concepts, without specifying to which concept each item 
(theoretically) “belongs.” In Table 2, we present the results of the exploratory factor anal-
ysis, including political trust, external political efficacy, and populist attitudes items. The 
results show that, as expected, and in line with other studies, the different items load suf-
ficiently (>0.400) on the different factors. With regard to cross-loadings, we find that 
three of the populism items load weakly (<0.400) on the external political efficacy scale. 
These items, especially the fifth populism item (i.e. “Elected officials talk too much and 
take too little action”), seem to measure the anti-elite dimension of populism more than 
the other questions, which is in line with the original scale development (see Akkerman 
et al., 2014; Hawkins et al., 2012; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002). However, the exter-
nal political efficacy items do not show any loading on the populist attitudes factor. Thus, 
there seems to be some overlap between some items of the populist attitudes scale and 
external political efficacy (those who mainly measure anti-elitism), but the external polit-
ical efficacy items do not load on the latent construct of populist attitudes. Furthermore, 
the political trust items load strongly on the political trust factor and do not show any 
relevant cross-loadings with either populist attitudes or external political efficacy.
Although this exploratory factor analysis is insightful for understanding the relation-
ship between each of the items and the different constructs, it does not formally test 
whether these constructs are coherent. To test whether political trust, external political 
efficacy, and populist attitudes are different constructs, we rely on confirmatory factor 
analyses.
We start by testing a single-factor model (m1 of Table 3). We hypothesize that populist 
attitudes, external political efficacy, and political trust constitute different constructs. 
However, if a one-factor model turns out to fit the data well, there is little point in evaluat-
ing more complex models (Kline, 2011). Furthermore, this model offers a benchmark to 
Table 2. Exploratory Factor Analysis.
Indicators Factor loadings
1 2 3
Political trust
 Trust1 0.020 0.919 −0.038
 Trust2 −0.008 0.933 −0.009
 Trust3 −0.005 0.932 0.007
 Trust4 −0.010 0.892 0.027
External political efficacy
 Eff1 −0.034 0.038 0.749
 Eff2 −0.023 −0.020 0.829
 Eff3 0.074 0.022 0.589
Populist attitudes
 Pop1 −0.715 0.079 0.043
 Pop2 −0.844 −0.047 0.095
 Pop3 −0.727 −0.100 0.003
 Pop4 −0.442 −0.002 −0.171
 Pop5 −0.441 −0.128 −0.312
 Pop6 −0.454 −0.134 −0.243
N = 1744. Bold values indicate highest loadings.
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compare the fit of the other multifactor models. To assess the fit of our confirmatory fac-
tor analysis (CFA) models, we rely on cut-off values as proposed by Hu and Bentler 
(1999): a root mean square error approximation (RMSEA) of < 0.08, a comparative fit 
index (CFI) of > 0.95, and a standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) of < 0.06.4
In Table 3, we present the fit statistics of the one-factor model. The results indicate that 
the one-factor measurement model provides a bad fit. Therefore, we move to the model 
with political trust, external political efficacy, and populist attitudes as different con-
structs (m2). The fit statistics of the three-factor model (RMSEA = 0.050; CFI = 0.964; 
SRMR = 0.031) indicate a good fit. Furthermore, Table 4 indicates that the items’ stand-
ardized loading on each factor is sufficient (>0.400) and that the McDonald’s Omega, 
indicating the internal consistency of latent constructs, reveals that each of the factors has 
high internal consistency (political trust = 0.954, external political efficacy = 0.915, and 
populist attitudes = 0.829) (McDonald, 1999). The factor covariances (see Table 4) range 
between −0.716 and 0.681, which indicates that, as expected, there is overlap between the 
factors, but these values are far from problematic (1.00) and are sufficiently lower than 
the poor discriminant validity threshold of 0.85 (Brown, 2014: 32, 126).5 In addition, we 
estimated two one-factor models in which political trust and external political efficacy 
(m3), political trust and populist attitudes (m4), and external political efficacy and popu-
list attitudes (m5) are combined in one factor. However, none of these models provided a 
model fit that is acceptable.6 Therefore, we conclude that political trust, external political 
efficacy, and populist attitudes are three separate constructs.
Different Concepts, But How Are They Different and Why Should We 
Care?
However, does this all matter empirically? After all, although we find that populist atti-
tudes are different from political trust and external political efficacy, this does not auto-
matically imply that populist attitudes are better at explaining voting for a populist party. 
Table 3. Values of Selected Fit Statistics for Measurement Models.
Model χ2M dfM RMSEA
(90% CI)
CFI SRMR
Measurement models  
m1 One-factor model 2055.738a 63 0.135a
(0.130–0.140)
0.722 0.099
m2 Three-factor model 320.413a 60 0.050b
(0.045–0.055)
0.964 0.031
m3 Political trust & external 
political efficacy
1086.609a 14 0.210a
(0.199–0.220)
0.785 0.123
m4 Political trust & populist 
attitudes
747.832a 33 0.111a
(0.105–0.118)
0.950 0.106
m5 External political efficacy 
& populist attitudes
722.829a 25 0.127a
(0.119–0.135)
0.861 0.078
N = 1744. Cutoff values: root mean square error approximation (RMSEA) < 0.08, comparative fit index 
(CFI) > 0.95, and standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) < 0.06. CI: confidence interval.
ap < 0.05.
bp = 0.501.
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Therefore, having established that political trust, external political efficacy, and populist 
attitudes are three distinct constructs, we now model the effect of these factors on voting 
for a populist party.
Table 5 presents the logistic regression estimates (log-odds) of political trust, external 
political efficacy, and populist attitudes on voting for a populist party. Model 1 indicates 
the effect of political trust on voting for a populist party (with controls). In Model 2, we 
include external political efficacy and controls. In Model 3, we include populist attitudes 
and controls. In Model 4, we include populist attitudes, political trust, and external politi-
cal efficacy simultaneously, along with the controls.
In Model 1, we see that those who score lower on political trust are more likely to vote 
for a populist party. The subsequent two models (Models 2 and 3) show that, respectively, 
lower external political efficacy and higher populist attitudes are related to a higher likeli-
hood of voting for a populist party. These results indicate that, without controlling for 
Table 4. Estimates of Factor Loadings, Factor Covariance and Internal Consistency for Three-
Factor Model.
Factor loadings
 Unstandardized 
estimate
Standard 
error
Standardized 
estimate
McDonald’s 
Omega
Indicators
 Political trust 0.954
  Trust1 1.000a — 0.901  
  Trust2 0.995 0.019 0.924  
  Trust3 1.028 0.027 0.931  
  Trust4 0.992 0.028 0.906  
 External political Efficacy 0.915
  Eff1 1.000 — 0.879  
  Eff2 1.098 0.027 0.965  
  Eff3 0.915 0.027 0.804  
 Populist attitudes 0.829
  Pop1 1.000a — 0.477  
  Pop2 1.560 0.076 0.639  
  Pop3 1.651 0.088 0.717  
  Pop4 1.129 0.073 0.555  
  Pop5 1.759 0.102 0.816  
  Pop6 1.937 0.118 0.775  
Factor covariances
  Political trust ↔ External 
political efficacy
1.140 0.052 0.681  
  Political trust ↔ Populist 
attitudes
−0.521 0.038 −0.625  
  External political efficacy↔ 
Populist attitudes
−0.276 0.018 −0.716  
Error covariances
 Pop1 ↔ Pop2 0.269 0.019 0.406  
 Pop2 ↔ Pop3 0.255 0.019 0.440  
aNot tested for statistical significance. For all other unstandardized estimates, p < .001; N = 1744.
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each other, lower political trust, lower external political efficacy, and higher populist 
attitudes are related to a higher probability of voting for a populist party.
However, to compare the relative strength of the three indicators, we also include them 
simultaneously. Thereby, the effect of one indicator is controlled for by the others. In 
Model 4, we estimate the effect of political trust, external political efficacy, and populist 
attitudes on voting for a populist party. This model indicates that, while political trust and 
populist attitudes still significantly affect the likelihood to vote for a populist party, the 
effect of external political efficacy disappears. Turning to the control variables, we find 
that higher educated people, women, and older people are less likely to cast a populist 
vote. Furthermore, individuals who oppose EU integration are more likely to vote for a 
populist party.
Figures 1 and 2 represent the average predicted probability (i.e. the average of the 
predicted probability for all individuals in the analysis) of voting for a populist party for 
different levels of political trust and populist attitudes (based on Model 4 of Table 5). 
While the effect for political trust seems to be linearly negatively related to the predicted 
probability to vote for a populist party, the effect of populist attitudes shows a different 
pattern. The effect of an increase from a low level to a medium level of populist attitudes 
does not seem to substantially affect the probability of voting for a populist party, but this 
Table 5. Logistic Regression Estimates of the Effect of Political Trust, External Political Efficacy, 
and Populist Attitudes on Voting for a Populist Party.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Indicators
 Political trust −0.389***
(0.043)
−0.148*
(0.068)
  External political 
efficacy
−1.219***
(0.129)
−0.139
(0.254)
 Populist attitudes 2.369***
(0.235)
1.682***
(0.381)
Education (ref. low)
 Middle −0.293
(0.192)
−0.221
(0.192)
−0.266
(0.192)
−0.251
(0.194)
 High −1.175***
(0.219)
−1.029***
(0.219)
−1.058***
(0.221)
−1.074***
(0.224)
Female (ref. male) −0.682***
(0.161)
−0.704***
(0.161)
−0.653***
(0.162)
−0.673***
(0.163)
Age −0.011*
(0.005)
−0.012*
(0.005)
−0.013*
(0.005)
−0.012*
(0.005)
Income equality 0.090
(0.083)
0.122
(0.082)
0.084
(0.084)
0.058
(0.085)
Cultural exclusion 0.251**
(0.093)
0.186*
(0.092)
0.166
(0.092)
0.170
(0.093)
Anti-EU 0.354***
(0.080)
0.331***
(0.081)
0.302***
(0.082)
0.265**
(0.082)
Intercept −2.708 −2.581 −2.272 −2.056
Explained variance  
 Nagelkerke R2 0.321 0.336 0.350 0.359
Standard errors in parentheses; N = 1351. EU = European Union.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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effect is much stronger for an increase from a medium level to a high level of populist 
attitudes. Furthermore, the predicted probabilities indicate that populist attitudes have, on 
average, a stronger effect on populist voting than political trust.
Figure 1. Average Predicted Probability of Voting for a Populist Party for Different Levels of 
Political Trust with 95% Confidence Interval.
Figure 2. Average Predicted Probability of Voting for a Populist Party for Different Levels of 
Populist Attitudes with 95% Confidence Intervals.
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Different Effects for Different Populist Parties?
Political trust and populist attitudes are important indicators of populist voting. However, 
this raises the question of whether this holds for all populist parties separately. To deter-
mine this, we perform a multinomial analysis. In addition to splitting the three populist 
parties, we also include a nonvoting category.
The results of the multinomial analyses are presented in Table 6. Political trust is nega-
tively related to voting for the PVV, and it also has a significant negative effect on nonvot-
ing. However, the effect of trust does not significantly relate to the likelihood of voting 
for the SP or the FvD. Although political trust explains voting for some populist parties, 
it does not explain all populist voting. Moreover, those who do not vote also exhibit lower 
levels of trust, but they do not exhibit high populist attitudes. External political efficacy 
has no significant effect on voting for any of the three populist parties, nor does it explain 
nonvoting.
Three indicators explain why individuals vote for all three populist parties: gender, 
cultural exclusion, and populist attitudes. For gender, we find that women are less likely 
to vote for each of the three populist parties, but they are also less likely to refrain from 
voting. Therefore, gender does not seem to differentiate between populist voting and 
Table 6. Multinomial Logistic Regression Estimates of the Effect of Populist Attitudes, Political 
Trust, and External Political Efficacy on Voting for the PVV, SP, FvD, and Nonvoting.
PVV vs 
Other
SP vs 
Other
FvD vs 
Other
Nonvoting 
vs Other
Indicators
 Political trust −0.396***
(0.113)
−0.137
(0.091)
−0.112
(0.121)
−0.520***
(0.157)
 External political Efficacy 0.326
(0.436)
−0.387
(0.336)
0.186
(0.457)
−0.079
(0.603)
 Populist attitudes 2.134***
(0.645)
1.042*
(0.500)
2.692***
(0.687)
0.471
(0.904)
Education (ref. low)
 Middle −0.651*
(0.305)
−0.268
(0.251)
0.392
(0.362)
0.100
(0.507)
 High −2.049***
(0.434)
−1.015***
(0.286)
−0.396
(0.430)
−0.533
(0.578)
Female (ref. male) −0.944***
(0.280)
−0.585**
(0.210)
−0.737*
(0.305)
−0.911*
(0.418)
Age −0.019*
(0.009)
−0.003
(0.007)
−0.037***
(0.009)
−0.032*
(0.013)
Income equality −0.122
(0.137)
0.409***
(0.124)
−0.300*
(0.142)
0.345
(0.232)
Cultural exclusion 1.063***
(0.194)
−0.302**
(0.115)
0.670***
(0.192)
0.168
(0.226)
Anti-EU −0.034
(0.138)
0.200
(0.105)
1.010***
(0.219)
0.032
(0.193)
Intercept −4.145 −2.723 −6.505 −3.734
Standard errors in parentheses; N = 1351. PVV: Partij voor de Vrijheid; SP: Socialistische Partij; FvD: Forum voor 
Democratie; EU = European Union.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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nonvoting. The cultural exclusion indicator is significant for all three populist parties, but 
not for nonvoting. However, the direction of the effect is different for the SP compared 
with the PVV and the FvD. Where voting for the latter two is more likely among those 
who favor cultural exclusion, voters for the SP oppose cultural exclusion. Thus, the only 
indicator that has a significant and positive relationship with voting for all three populist 
parties (both left- and right-wing) and does not explain nonvoting is populist attitudes.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this article, we are interested in the relationship between political trust, external political 
efficacy, and populist attitudes. We examine the degree to which political trust, external 
political efficacy, and populist attitudes are different constructs, that is, the extent to which 
they are conceptually different, the degree to which they are empirically different latent 
constructs, and the extent to which these three indicators are unique predictors of voting 
for populist parties. We argue that the three constructs are conceptually different and that 
they measure empirically distinct phenomena. Moreover, we show that these differences 
affect their explanatory power, that is, the extent to which they explain populist voting.
Theoretically, we argue that political trust, external political efficacy, and populist 
attitudes are constructs that reflect different core components of populism: the pure peo-
ple versus the corrupt elite, antagonism, and the general will. We argue that political trust 
mainly reflects the anti-elitism of populism. External political efficacy addresses the anti-
elitism and, to a lesser extent, the people-centeredness of populism. Populist attitudes, on 
the other hand, capture all three core components of populism: people-centrism and anti-
elitism, the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite, and a focus on the 
general will.
Applying exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses, we show that political trust, 
external political efficacy, and populist attitudes are three different constructs, but we do 
see that there is overlap (i.e. correlation) among these three constructs. Something we 
would expect from concepts that theoretically tap partly into one common feature of pop-
ulism: anti-elitism.
Furthermore, we argue that populist attitudes bring more to the table than external 
political efficacy and political trust with regard to their ability to explain voting for a 
populist party. We find that without the presence of populist attitudes and political trust in 
the model, external political efficacy does explain voting for a populist party. However, 
with populist attitudes and political trust in the model, we find that external political effi-
cacy is no longer significant. In other words, even though there is some overlap between 
the three concepts, external political efficacy is not a robust predictor of populist voting. 
The difference between the three concepts becomes even more important when we dif-
ferentiate between different populist parties (i.e. the PVV, the SP, and the FvD). Here, we 
see that populist attitudes are the only consistent and exclusive indicator of voting for a 
populist party. From the three sets of attitudes under study—political trust, external politi-
cal efficacy, and populist attitudes—we find that only the latter is able to explain voting 
for left- and right-wing populist parties.
We conclude that if we seek to explain populist voting, populist attitudes are a more 
robust indicator than external political efficacy and political trust. Populist attitudes are 
the only construct that conceptually captures all three components of populism and 
empirically explains why individuals vote for a variety of populist parties. Although our 
study tests the relationship between political trust, external political efficacy, and populist 
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attitudes in the Netherlands, we do not expect that the relationships between the con-
structs are different for other countries. Nevertheless, since the three concepts and their 
measurements have been applied to a range of countries in Europe and beyond, future 
research is welcomed to verify our findings in other countries or across countries.
Applying our analysis on a sample from the Netherlands has several important advan-
tages. First, this allows us to distinguish between three different types of populist parties. 
This becomes particularly important in the multinomial model. We show that populist 
attitudes are able to explain voting, for three populist parties, on the political left and the 
political right, something that is essential for testing the relevance of the populist attitudes 
measurement. After all, the populist attitudes measurement was developed to measure 
populism among individuals, regardless of their ideological (or political left-right) posi-
tion (i.e. as a thin-centered ideology). In addition, testing our results for three different 
populist parties is important for our conclusions with regard to the effect of populist atti-
tudes on nonvoting. We find that populist attitudes explain voting for both left- and right-
wing populist parties, but are not related to nonvoting. However, it might be that in other 
countries in which there is no populist party available to voters (either left-wing, right-
wing, or both), that the relationship between populist attitudes and nonvoting is different. 
For example, it might be that in a country like Austria, left-wing individuals with strong 
populist attitudes abstain from voting, since the Austrian party system does not have a 
left-wing populist party. However, should this be the case, this would only further dem-
onstrate the extent to which the Netherlands is an important case. Our finding, that in the 
Netherlands, populist attitudes do not explain non-voting, highlights the need to distin-
guish between populism and broader political discontent.
Our study has important implications for the further study of populism. First, the fact 
that populist attitudes are a more robust explanation of why individuals vote for populist 
parties points to the importance of not only focusing on anti-elitism but also on the peo-
ple-centered (in conjunction with anti-elitism) nature of populism. Adjusting the focus of 
why voters support populist parties may shed new light on the reasons behind the contin-
ued success of populist parties. Second, and as a result, focusing on the people-centered 
nature of populism may also link populism (and the success of populist parties) to debates 
about political representation, that is, debates about implementing democratic innova-
tions such as referenda and deliberative democracy (e.g. Jacobs et al., 2018a). Finally, our 
findings have important implications for the study of politics more broadly speaking. The 
study of populism currently touches on a variety of important topics within political sci-
ence, including foreign policy (Plagemann and Destradi, 2018; Verbeek and Zaslove, 
2017), party politics (Wolinetz and Zaslove, 2018), political psychology (Bakker et al., 
2016), and coalition formation (Plescia and Eberl, 2019). The conclusions from this arti-
cle regarding the distinct nature of populist attitudes (both theoretically and empirically), 
from political trust and external political efficacy, can shed important insights into these 
broader discussions.
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Notes
1. For stylistic reasons, we will not always indicate that the vote was intended (instead of recalled) in the 
remainder of the article.
2. For the economic, cultural, and political attaching attitudes, individuals were asked to position themselves 
on as scale from 1 to 5 in which 1 meant income difference should increase, immigrants should be allowed 
to hold on to their own culture, and European integration should go further while 5 meant income differ-
ence should decrease, immigrants should adapt to our culture, and European integration has gone too far.
3. This method uses the full weight matrix to compute robust standard errors and the mean- and variance-
adjusted test statistic.
4. Because of our large N (N > 300), we do not rely on the χ2 statistics. Nevertheless, we present this statistic 
since the other fit indices are based on this statistic.
5. We also checked for multicollinearity. No multicollinearity was shown for any of the coefficients in the 
models presented in this article (Hair et al., 1998: 220–221) (results available upon request).
6. We also ran six analyses in which we loaded the populist attitudes items (one per model) to the external 
efficacy measurement. Furthermore, we ran three models in which we included each of the external effi-
cacy items (one per model) to the populist attitudes measurement. In addition, we ran a model in which 
we replaced the items with the highest loading on the political efficacy (Pop5 & Pop6) with the political 
efficacy items. None of these models showed an adequate model fit (results available upon request).
ORCID iD
Bram Geurkink  https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9722-2731
References
Akkerman A, Mudde C and Zaslove A (2014) How Populist Are the People? Measuring Populist Attitudes in 
Voters. Comparative Political Studies 47 (9): 1324–1353.
Akkerman A, Zaslove A and Spruyt B (2017) “We the People” or “We the Peoples”? A Comparison of Support 
for the Populist Radical Right and Populist Radical Left in the Netherlands. Swiss Political Science 
Review 23 (4): 377–403.
Anduiza E, Guinjoan M and Rico G (2018) Economic Crisis, Populist Attitudes, and the Birth of Podemos 
in Spain. In: Giugni M and Grasso MT (eds) Citizens and the Crisis. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
pp.61–81.
Bakker BN, Rooduijn R and Schumacher G (2016) The Psychological Roots of Populist Voting: Evidence from 
the United States, the Netherlands and Germany. European Journal of Political Research 55 (2): 302–320.
Betz HG (1994) Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Brown TA (2014) Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Applied Research. New York: Guilford Publications.
Castanho Silva B, Andreadis I, Anduiza E, et al. (2019) Public Opinion Surveys: A New Scale. In: Hawkins KA, 
Carlin RE, Littvay L, et al. (eds) The Ideational Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Analysis. 
London: Routledge, pp.150–179.
CentERdata (2018) Politics and Values: Wave 10. Available at: https://www.dataarchive.lissdata.nl/study 
_units/view/747 (accessed 4 June 2018).
CentERdata (n.d.) About the Panel. Available at: https://www.lissdata.nl/about-panel (accessed 4 June 2018).
Craig SC (1979) Efficacy, Trust, and Political Behavior: An Attempt to Resolve a Lingering Conceptual 
Dilemma. American Politics Quarterly 7 (2): 225–239.
Craig SC, Niemi RG and Silver GE (1990) Political Efficacy and Trust: A Report on the NES Pilot Study Items. 
Political Behavior 12 (3): 289–314.
Doyle D (2011) The Legitimacy of Political Institutions: Explaining Contemporary Populism in Latin America. 
Comparative Political Studies 44 (11): 1447–1473.
Fieschi C and Heywood P (2004) Trust, Cynicism and Populist Anti-Politics. Journal of Political Ideologies 9 
(3): 289–309.
Hair JF, Anderson RE, Tatham RL, et al. (1998) Multivariate Data Analysis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice 
Hall.
Hawkins KA (2009) Is Chávez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative Perspective. 
Comparative Political Studies 42 (8): 1040–1067.
Hawkins KA, Riding S and Mudde C (2012) Measuring Populist Attitudes. Available at https://works.bepress 
.com/cas_mudde/72/download (accessed 20 April 2018).
20 Political Studies 00(0)
Hawkins KA, Rovira Kaltwasser C and Andreadis I (2018) The Activation of Populist Attitudes. Government 
and Opposition. Epub ahead of print 13 September. DOI:10.1017/gov.2018.23.
Hetherington MJ (1998) The Political Relevance of Political Trust. American Political Science Review 92 (4): 
791–808.
Hibbing JR and Theiss-Morse E (2002) Stealth Democracy: Americans’ Beliefs about How Government Should 
Work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hu L and Bentler PM (1999) Cutoff Criteria for Fit Indexes in Covariance Structure Analysis: Conventional 
Criteria Versus New Alternatives. Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal 6 (1): 1–55.
Jacobs K, Akkerman A and Zaslove A (2018a) The Voice of Populist People? Referendum Preferences, 
Practices and Populist Attitudes. Acta Politica 53 (4): 517–541.
Jacobs K, Van Klingeren M, Van der Kolk H, et al. (2018b) Het Wiv-referendum: Het Nationaal Referendum 
Onderzoek 2018.  [The Wiv-referendum: The National Referendum Study 2018]. Enschede: Gildeprint.
Kline RB (2011) Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling. New York: Guilford publications.
McDonald RP (1999) Test Theory: A Unified Treatment. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Moffitt B (2016) The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style, and Representation. Palo Alto, 
CA: Stanford University Press.
Mudde C (1996) The War of Words Defining the Extreme Right Party Family. West European Politics 19 (2): 
225–248.
Mudde C (2004) The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition 39 (4): 542–563.
Mudde C (2007) Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mudde C (2017) An Ideational Approach. In: Rovira Kaltwasser C, Taggart PA, Espejo PO, et al. (eds) The 
Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.27–47.
Mudde C and Rovira Kaltwasser C (2013) Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary 
Europe and Latin America. Government and Opposition 48 (2): 147–174.
Mudde C and Rovira Kaltwasser C (2017) Populism: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Norris P (2005) Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market. New York: Cambridge University 
Press.
Norris P (2011) Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Passarelli G and Tuorto D (2018) The Five Star Movement: Purely a Matter of Protest? The Rise of a New Party 
between Political Discontent and Reasoned Voting. Party Politics 24 (2): 129–140.
Plagemann J and Destradi S (2018) Populism and Foreign Policy: The Case of India. Foreign Policy Analysis 
15 (2): 283–301.
Plescia C and Eberl JM (2019) “Not my Government!” The Role of Norms and Populist Attitudes on Voter 
Preferences for Government Formation after the Election. Party Politics. Epub ahead of print 5 February. 
DOI:10.1177/1354068819827513.
Rooduijn M (2014) The Nucleus of Populism: In Search of the Lowest Common Denominator. Government 
and Opposition 49 (4): 573–599.
Rooduijn M (2018) What Unites the Voter Bases of Populist Parties? Comparing the Electorates of 15 Populist 
Parties. European Political Science Review 10 (3): 351–368.
Rooduijn M (2019) State of the Field: How to Study Populism and Adjacent Topics? A Plea for Both More and 
Less Focus. European Journal of Political Research 58 (1): 362–372.
Rooduijn M and Akkerman T (2017) Flank Attacks: Populism and Left-Right Radicalism in Western Europe. 
Party Politics 23 (3): 193–204.
Rooduijn M and Pauwels T (2011) Measuring Populism: Comparing Two Methods of Content Analysis. West 
European Politics 34 (6): 1272–1283.
Rooduijn M, Van der Brug W and De Lange SL (2016) Expressing or Fueling Discontent? The Relationship 
between Populist Voting and Political Discontent. Electoral Studies 43: 32–40.
Rosseel Y (2012) Lavaan: An R Package for Structural Equation Modeling. Journal of Statistical Software 48 
(2): 1–36.
Rummens S (2017) Populism as a Threat to Liberal Democracy. In: Rovira Kaltwasser C, Taggart PA, Espejo 
PO, et al. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.554–570.
Spruyt B, Keppens G and Van Droogenbroeck F (2016) Who Supports Populism and What Attracts People to 
It? Political Research Quarterly 69 (2): 335–346.
Stanley B (2008) The Thin Ideology of Populism. Journal of Political Ideologies 13 (1): 95–110.
Taggart P (1995) New Populist Parties in Western Europe. West European Politics 18 (1): 34–51.
Geurkink et al. 21
Taggart P (2018) Populism and “Unpolitics.” In: Fitzi G, Mackert J and Turner BS (eds) Populism and the 
Crisis of Democracy: Concepts and Theory, vol. 1. London: Routledge, pp.79–86.
Thomassen J, Andeweg R and Van Ham C (2017) Political Trust and the Decline of Legitimacy Debate: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Investigation into their Interrelationship. In Zmerli S and Van der Meer T (eds) 
Handbook on Political Trust. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, pp.509–525.
Van der Brug W (2003) How the LPF Fuelled Discontent: Empirical Tests of Explanations of LPF Support. 
Acta Politica 38 (1): 89–106.
Van der Kolk H (2018) Populisme, Immigratie en Europa [Populism, Immigration and Europe]. In: Van der 
Meer T, Van der Kolk H and Rekker R (eds) Aanhoudend Wisselvallig: Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek 
2017. Amsterdam: Stichting Kiezersonderzoek Nederland, pp.66–77.
Van der Meer T and Hakhverdian A (2017) Political Trust as the Evaluation of Process and Performance: A 
Cross-National Study of 42 European Countries. Political Studies 65 (1): 81–102.
Van Hauwaert SM and Van Kessel S (2018) Beyond Protest and Discontent: A Cross-National Analysis of the 
Effect of Populist Attitudes and Issue Positions on Populist Party Support. European Journal of Political 
Research 57 (1): 68–92.
Van Hauwaert SM, Schimpf CH and Azevedo F (2019) Public Opinions Surveys: Evaluating Existing 
Measures. In: Hawkins KA, Carlin RE, Littvay L, et al. (eds) The Ideational Approach to Populism: 
Concept, Theory, and Analysis. London: Routledge, pp.128–149.
Verbeek JA and Zaslove A (2017) Populism and Foreign Policy. In: Rovira Kaltwasser C, Taggart PA, Espejo 
PO, et al. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.384–405.
Weyland K (2001) Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics. 
Comparative Politics 34 (1): 1–22.
Wolinetz S and Zaslove A (2018) Absorbing the Blow: Populist Parties and Their Impact on Parties and Party 
Systems. London: ECPR Press/Rowman & Littlefield International.
Zaslove A (2008) Here to Stay? Populism as a New Party Type. European Review 16 (3): 319–336.
Author Biographies
Bram Geurkink is a PhD candidate in the Economics Department at the Institute for Management Research at 
Radboud University. His research interests include political behavior, political socialization in the workplace, 
workplace voice, and populism.
Andrej Zaslove is an assistant professor in the Political Science Department at the Institute for Management 
Research at Radboud University. His research interests include populism, measuring populism (supply and 
demand), populist voting behavior, and populism and democracy.
Roderick Sluiter is a postdoctoral researcher in the Economics Department and lecturer in the Political Science 
Department, both at the Institute for Management Research at Radboud University. His research interests 
include workplace voice, precarious work, and political behavior.
Kristof Jacobs is an assistant professor in the Political Science Department at the Institute for Management 
Research at Radboud University. His research interests include democratic challenges and innovations, pop-
ulism, democracy, and elite behavior.
